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Abstract. Transport Costs are one of the most important sources of barriers
to trade. Inspired by this concern, we use an ad-hoc empirical model to examine
the possible determinants of transport costs.
Using a country aggregate bilateral transport costs database for 1990, we
replicate Limao and Venables (2001) and we find that the effect of their infras-
tructure index on transport costs is not robust. Following Micco (2004) and
Micco and Serebrinzky (2005) we calculate two alternative indexes of infras-
tructure. Using these new indexes we find that not only distance but infrastruc-
ture, political stability, common bilateral ties and open sky agreements as well
are other important channels through which transport costs can be reduced.
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Resumen. Los costos de transporte son una de las más importantes fuentes
de barreras al comercio. Inspirados por este aspecto, utilizamos un modelo
emṕırico ad-hoc con el fin de examinar los posibles determinantes de los costos
de transporte.
Utilizando una base de datos de costos de transporte bilaterales para el año
1990, replicamos el trabajo de Limao y Venables (2001) y encontramos que
el efecto de su ı́ndice de infraestructura sobre los costos de transporte no es
robusto. Siguiendo a Micco (2004) y Micco y Serebrinzky (2005) calculamos
dos ı́ndices alternativos de infraestructura. Utilizando estos ı́ndices encontra-
mos que aparte de la distancia, la infraestructura, la estabilidad poĺıtica, las
relaciones bilaterales comunes y los acuerdos de cielos abiertos son otros impor-
tantes canales mediante los cuales los costos de transporte pueden reducirse.
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1. Introduction
Transport Costs are one of the most important sources of barriers to trade.
As Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) explain, several puzzles can be explained by
their existence. But as Hummels (2006) points out, the literature has not yet
devoted enough attention to try to model the determinants of transport costs.
Previous approaches have modeled them, but the approaches are completely ad-
hoc and they are characterized by heuristic functional specifications. Therefore,
we believe that future work can be developed in this area.
Given this concern, we use an ad-hoc empirical model to examine the pos-
sible determinants of transport costs, inspired specially by the fact that they
have been decreasing since the early 1980’s.1 In particular, we estimate the
effect of infrastructure and distance on bilateral transport costs. Using a coun-
try aggregate bilateral transport costs database for 1990, Limao and Venables
(2001) (henceforth LV) estimate that the deterioration of the infrastructure
index of a country from the median level to the 75th percentile raises transport
costs by 12 percentage points. This effect implies a reduction in trade volume
by around 28 percent.2
Following the same approach, we replicate LV results, and we find that the
effect of his infrastructure index on transport costs is not robust. Adopting
Micco (2004) and Micco and Serebrinzky (2005) we calculate two alternative
measures of infrastructure which we consider are a better proxy of the port
infrastructure of a country. In addition, we estimate the effect of common bi-
lateral ties, country political stability and open sky agreements on transport
costs.
We found that in addition to distance, infrastructure, political stability,
common bilateral ties and open sky agreements are other important channels
through which transport costs can be reduced.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section II sets up the model and
the empirical estimation strategy that LV used. Section III performs a detailed
description of the required data. In particular, the section describes how we
calculate the infrastructure measures. Section IV describe the results obtained.
First, we replicate the results obtained by LV in tables 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8.
Second we expand the data, and we perform panel data estimates of the effects
with the LV infrastructure index, and our new infrastructure variables and the
new sets of controls. Section V concludes.
1See figure 1 in appendix A.
2Limao, N. and Venables, J. (2001), p. 451.
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2. The Model
Following LV, we know that the unit costs of shipping a good (Tij) from
country i to country j in period t is given by the following equation:3
Tij = T (xij , Xi, Xj, µij) (1)
Where xij is a vector of characteristics related to the journey between coun-
try i and country j. Xi is a vector of characteristics related to country i. Xj
is a vector of characteristics related to country j, and µij is a vector of nonob-
servables.
Following the trade literature,4 LV used the bilateral distance between coun-
try i and county j and a border dummy variable as the journey specific variables
defined in xij . As expected, the higher the distance between the two destina-
tions the higher the transport cost are, and second, when two countries share
a common border, we would expect that other factors besides distance might
reduce transport costs.
First, neighboring countries might have more integrated transport networks
that reduce transport costs. Second, neighboring countries might have similar
customs agreements or transit rules that decrease the amount of time expended
in transporting goods between destinations. This implies a reduction in the
shipping and insurance costs charged per good. Third, the higher the trade
volume among neighboring countries, the lower the fixed costs are.5 The reason
is due to the fact that the high volume of trade between two locations reduces
the fixed costs shared by the senders within the two destination points because
of cargo backhauling.6
As for the country specific characteristics defined in Xi or Xj , LV only focus
their attention on geographical and infrastructure measures. For geographical
characteristics, LV controls if either the country is an island or not, and they
also control whether the country is landlocked or not.7
The motivation to focus on these two measures is given by the fact that
landlocked countries might have higher transport costs since they do not have
ports; therefore, cargo must first pass through neighboring countries first, which
increases the time of transportation and in consequence increases transport
costs. In relation to islands, they expect that islands may have better ports
infrastructure which implies a reduction in transport costs.
3For simplification, we suppress sub index t.
4Anderson and Wincoop (2004) performed a detailed survey of the approaches followed
by trade literature.
5Limao and Venables (2001), pp. 453-454.
6For further reference see Micco et al. (2004).
7In particular, the landlocked variable is a dichotomic variable that takes the value of one
if the country is landlocked, zero otherwise. The island variable is also a dichotomic variable
that takes the value of one if the country is an island, zero otherwise.
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Since LV use information at country level8 obtained from the Directional
Trade Data (DOTS), the ad valorem transport cost factor between country i
and country j is defined as the ratio between C.I.F and F.O.B trade values.9







= t (xij , Xi, Xj , µ̃ij) (2)
Under the assumption that tij can be approximated by a log linear function,
we can proxy transport cost factors between country i and country j by the
following equation:10
ln tij = α̃+ β̃xij + γ̃
′ lnXi + δ̃
′ lnXj + ωj (3)
Where we assume that ωj is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables
previously defined in xij , Xi and Xj . As we discuss in the following section,
there are a couple of factors that should be taken into account before advancing
to estimate equation (3). First, the results obtained by LV are based on the
strong assumption that transport costs are a linear function of the variables
defined. This can be tested by introducing some non linear relationships with
the infrastructure variable per country. Since we are following LV, we do not
test for the non linear relationship of the infrastructure indexes. Second, Yeats
(1978) and Hummels (2006) point out transport cost data proxy by the matched
partner technique11 has an important portion of its own variance explained by
noise. Third, since DOTS data is obtained from three different sources, it is
subject to data differences that are not related to trade costs. Certain statistical
offices may value goods differently, i.e. fluctuation of the exchange rate within
the time that it takes to transport the good between location may determine
different valuation methods for products in C.I.F and FOB values respectively.
Fourth, discrepancy in levels of C.I.F and FOB among matched country data
can induce to high ad valorem transport costs. Fifth, DOTS data for a single
year for a given country might change within different publications. Although
the change is small in levels, it’s implication on the ad valorem transport cost
rate (as defined in equation 2) could be important.
8The data section provides a complete description of the variables used to replicate LV
results. In addition, we provide a detailed description of the additional variables to perform
the extensions to LV results.
9C.I.F. represents the value of imports at the first port of entry of the importer country
(i). The measure is based on the purchase price and includes all freight, insurance, and other
charges excluding import duties incurred in bringing the merchandise from the country of
exportation (j).
F.O.B represents the value of the good at the port of exportation in country (j). The
export value excludes any import duties at country (i), and it also excludes any other charge




ratio obtained from DOTS data.
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3. Data
Since this paper replicates tables 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 from LV, the variables
that we need to replicate the results obtained by the authors are: ad valorem
transport costs, bilateral distance between countries i and j, common border
dummy, island dummy for countries i and j, GDP and GDP per capita for
countries i and j, infrastructure index for countries i and j, landlocked dummy,
African country dummy for countries i and j and rule of law and control of
corruption of countries i and j.
Ad valorem transport costs (tij) defined by equation (2) were directly calcu-
lated from DOTS trade data for year 2005. As explained by Hummels (2006),
this data has the advantage that it has a very good coverage, it has information
of bilateral imports and exports at C.I.F and F.O.B trade values for almost all
the countries of the world from 1948 up to the present (with a lag of two years).
But as we mentioned before, it has some problems as well. The IMF builds up
this data from several sources, which implies that the data has variations that
are not due to transport costs. So when we proxy tij by equation (2), part of
the variation in tij is not due to transport costs per se.
Differences across countries can be due to different valuations of trade; i.e.
at F.O.B a country can report value of good in the ship, and another can report
the value of the good before entering the ship, the U.S. values imports at the
exchange rate due the same day the product enters the first port, but other
countries use the average exchange rate within the period that it took the good
to arrive from country i to country j. Other differences can be explained by the
country quality of the data. This bias is particularly important for developing
countries where the quality of data is usually lower than in developed countries.
Another source of differences are the re-adjustments made by the IMF to
clarify errors and mistakes from previous years. So even though we access the
raw data to calculate tij , our measure by definition is different from the measure
used by LV because IMF has corrected the numbers.
In addition, IMF has a rule of imputing values for imports and exports. If
data is available for F.O.B exports but not for C.I.F. imports, for countries i
and j, then it replaces the C.I.F missing values by a factor of 1.1 respect to
F.O.B, and if there is data on C.I.F but not on F.O.B, then it replaces the
missing F.O.B discounting 9% on C.I.F data.
Finally, the data reports values for imports and exports near zero, which
could lead to over estimation of the transport cost. According to the summary
statistics reported by LV, tij ad valorem transport costs are around 87% and
400% which is a very good example of the noise of the data used by LV.
To address this problem, first, we do not take into account the bilateral
import and export data that has the imputation rule previously described.
Second, the ad valorem transport costs used are between 4% and 248% [Hum-
mels (2006) suggests a reasonable value of 200%]. So all the results reported
through tables 1-6 of this paper have a bilateral sample size of 3,077 observa-
tions. Comparing to LV, our sample is lower since he uses 4,516 observations
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to estimate the same tables.
The variables of bilateral distance, common border, landlocked and island
dummy variables were calculated using the information reported by the CIA
World Factbook,12 which is the same source used by LV. In particular, bilateral
distance was calculated using the world great distance formula.
GDP, GDP per capita and the infrastructure index were also obtained from
the same source, World Development Indicators, but we used the 2007 version.
This would imply some small distortions caused by the data revision that the
World Bank performed to correct for previous editions mistakes.13 However,
special attention has to be applied to the way the authors define the infras-
tructure index. This variable is not a variable directly calculated by the World
Bank; this variable is defined by the following equation:
inf rai =
[




where j =1, 1/3 and
teli: telephone mainlines per capita in country i,
roadsi: total road network in country i,
pavedi: percentage of paved roads in country i,
raili: total rail lines routes in country i.
(4)
As explained by LV, the better the infrastructure level of the ports the
lower transport costs are since insurance and time of transportation are re-
duced. Given that they do not have access to this data, they calculate an
infrastructure index (equation (4)). LV emphasize that roads, rails, and tele-
phone infrastructures are highly correlated to port infrastructures. But instead,
I found this measure not as good as they claim, since this average is on the
variables that reflect the interconnection within the country and this may not
reflect the real infrastructure level of the ports of the country. As an example,
Paraguay is a landlocked country, so the infrastructure index should reflect
only the infrastructure of the airports, but, instead, the index is classifying this
country as having a similar level as a country that has a similar size and is not
landlocked; i.e. Costa Rica (both countries are in their sample). In addition,
they are not controlling by country size, neither by population density.
Taking this into account, in our extensions (tables 7-10), we performed a
robustness check on the LV infrastructure index. As it is shown the index is
not statistically different from zero. Following Micco et al. (2004) and Micco
and Serebrinzky (2005), we use two infrastructure indexes that measure the
infrastructure level of sea ports and the airports per country. Both of our in-
dexes control for country size and population density. As explained in Micco et
al. (2004) the infrastructure index of airports controls for two characteristics.
12https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html
13As shown in our summary statistics, island, landlocked and bilateral distance variables
are very similar to the summary statistics reported by LV.
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It controls for the quality of the airports per country, and by the population
density and the size of the country. By quality we mean that we are able to
determine how many airports are located within 50, 75 and 100 km radius
distance from the most important cities of each country. This controls for the
amount of population that the airport serves. Highly populated airports may
have higher transport costs since it implies higher congestions; increasing trans-
port costs. Second, we can control for the length of the airport airways. In our
case, we use two measures, airways with at least 2000 or 2500 meter long. This
means that the longer the airways, the bigger the type of plane that can land
in the airport. Therefore, the bigger the cargo that can be transported and the
lower the transport costs are per unit of good transported.
As for maritime ports and following Micco (2005), we constructed a port in-
dex per country that controls for the quality of the ports in several dimensions.
To construct this index we used the information of the port at the port level
within the country. The data used enables us to determine how many ports
each country of the world has, and in addition we can determine the size, the
exact location, the type of water access to the port (river or ocean), the size
of the channel of the port, the cargo pier length, the types of communications
that the port has, the types of cranes, the maximum capacity of the lifts that
it has to move the cargo, and we can also determine if a port can perform
services to the incoming ships. All this information was taken into account to
build the index. So our indexes truly reflect the infrastructure level of airport
and maritime port within a country. Therefore, our country indexes are just the
average of the infrastructure index of each maritime port and airport within
the country.14
Finally, we include two variables that measure the political and enforce-
ment of the law within a country. We believe that the lower the security is
in a port, the higher the insurance per good is; increasing transport costs. In
particular, we use two Kauffman political indexes;15 Rule of Law and Control
of Corruption.16
14To be able to construct the airport infrastructure index, we used the information per
city and airports that is obtained from www.tageo.com. In particular the website offers
the latitude, longitude and population of each of the most important sixty cities within
the country. As for the airports, the webpage offers the location coordinates as well as the
information about the width, and the length of the airports within a country. This is why we
can calculate the number of airports that on average a city of country i has access to within
a radius of 50, 75 and 100 km, controlling for the size of the runaways.
For the case of ports, we use the data available at www.portualia.com.
15To be able to construct the airport infrastructure index, we used the information per
city and airports that is obtained from www.tageo.com. In particular the website offers
the latitude, longitude and population of each of the most important sixty cities within
the country. As for the airports, the webpage offers the location coordinates as well as the
information about the width, and the length of the airports within a country. This is why we
can calculate the number of airports that on average a city of country i has access to within
a radius of 50, 75 and 100 km, controlling for the size of the runaways.
For the case of ports, we use the data available at www.portualia.com.
16For further reference see Kaufmann, D. and Kraay, A., and Massimo Mastruzzi, M.
(2006).
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The following section presents the results obtained for the replications (ta-
bles 1-6), and for the extensions (tables 7-10).
4. Estimation Results
As we mentioned in the previous section, our results are divided in two
sets: Replication and Extensions. In particular, first, we replicate the results
obtained by LV for tables 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8. Then, we expand the data as
a robustness check for LV infrastructure index. We include new measures of
country infrastructure indexes and we control for other country variables that
might affect transport costs. Therefore, we proceed to estimate a panel for the
years comprehended between 1990-2003, controlling for country and year fixed
effects.
4.1. Cross Section Results, 1990.
Following LV and our previous data description, we acknowledge that the
ad valorem transport costs data is censored, therefore, we proceed to estimate
equation (3) with a lower limit Tobit for year 1990.
Table 1 exhibits the results obtained when we estimate ad valorem transport
costs as a function of bilateral distance, GDP per capita of countries i and
j, border dummy, island dummy for countries i and j, GDP per capita for
countries i and j, infrastructure index for countries i and j and landlocked
infrastructure indexes for countries i and j. The first three columns are obtained
using lower limit Tobit estimation, and the fourth column includes partner
country fixed effects. In general, our results are very similar to the results
obtained by LV, they have the correct sign and similar coefficients. The only
differences in the results are given by the sign of the island dummy effect for
i country and the landlocked infrastructure level. In LV, the island dummy is
negative and is only statistically different from zero in one specification. On
the contrary, in our results the sign is positive. As for landlocked infrastructure
index, in our case it is not statistically different from zero.
It is important to acknowledge the infrastructure index is always significant
and has the correct sign. By definition from equation (4), the infrastructure
index coefficient should be positive because the LV index is really the inverse
of the infrastructure level and we know an increase in the infrastructure of a
country reduces the index determine by equation (4) and reduces the level of
transport costs as well.
Column 1 reports the effect of bilateral distance on transport alone. Its co-
efficient across the different specifications is very similar to the values obtained
by LV. In addition, the decrease of a country’s ad valorem transport cost from
the top 25 percentile to the 50th percentile is equivalent to a reduction in the
bilateral distance of 1273 km.17 Furthermore, if we ask the question of how
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much closer must two otherwise identical countries be if they do not share a
border and are to have the same transport costs?18 We find that the countries
should be 964 km closer.19 This suggests that, besides distance, the intercom-
munication of neighboring countries explains a very important component of
the structure of transport costs. A final interesting remark is given by the re-
sults of our R2. As LV show, R2 increases as we include other variables besides
distance. The later only explains around 8% of the variation of the transport
costs. In contrast when we add the other variables we explain an additional
38% of the variance of the transport cost.
Instead of looking directly at the ad valorem transport costs, we proceed to








Where bilateral imports (Mij) depends on the income of the two countries,
and on the level of transport costs. Taking logs, and replacing transport costs
as defined by equation (3) we obtain the following expression:20
M̃ij = ψ0 + ψ1GDP̃i + ψ2GDP̃j + τ
[
β̃xij + γ̃




Where τ is the transport cost elasticity. Since we know that vectors xij , Xi,
and Xj are compose by bilateral and country specific variables, then equation
that we want to estimate is given by the following specification:
M̃ij = ψ0 + ψ1GDP̃i + ψ1GDP̃2 + ψ3Dist̃ij + ψ4 borderij
+ ψ5 isli + ψ6 islj + ψ7 inf ãi + ψ8 inf ãj + ψ9 llock̃ inf i
+ ψ10 llock̃ inf j + ψ11GDP̃perki + ψ12GDP̃perkj + ηij (7)
Where border, isl, inf, llock̃, and GDPperk are the border dummy, the
island dummy, LV infrastructure index, landlocked infrastructure index and
GDP per capita, respectively. Table 2, shows the results obtained when we
estimate equation (7) with the same data set used for transport costs. Again,
all of our estimated coefficients have the correct sign, are statistically different
from zero at 1%, and have similar values as the reported by LV. One difference
has to be taken into account. The LV infrastructure index in our results is not as
robust as the results presented by LV. In sum we obtain that an increase in the
infrastructure index from the median to the 25th percentile increases imports in
The numbers are obtained from fourth column table 1, and from summary statistics of
distance, and infrastructure level.
18Following LV, p. 460.







. Coefficients where obtained from column
four, table 1.
20In our notation ˜ means logarithm.
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40%.21 In terms of distance, the countries should need to be 655 km22 closer to
experience this level of imports. This implies that the effects of infrastructure
on trade are very important.
In addition, we previously defined τ as the transport cost elasticity. As
determined by equations (6) and (7), we have overidentifying restrictions to
estimate the transport costs elasticity. Therefore, our estimates for τ can be
given by two different procedures. First we can estimate τ with the ratio of
corresponding estimates of the Gravity equation and the transport cost spec-
ifications (columns 1, 2), or we can estimate it using the predicted transport
costs estimates obtained by equations (6) and (7).
Table 3 reports the results obtained with the first approach. As it is shown
in column 3, the transport costs elasticity varies from −3.64 to −0.22. As
explained by LV, the reason for this dispersion is given by the fact that “...some
variables influence trade volumes by other channels different to transport costs;
i.e. distance and border effects might be expected to influence trade volumes
through information flows, language and cultural ties”23 which are not taken
into account in any of our specifications. That is the reason for our estimated
parameter to tend to zero.24
On the other hand, table 4 reports the results obtained when following
the second approach. Under this approach, instead of replacing the observed
value of transport costs, we use their predicted values. This alternate approach
enables us to directly estimate the transport cost elasticity under the spec-
ification established by equation (6). As shown, our transport cost elasticity
varies from −0.20 up to −1.066. There are three important differences in our
results with respect to LV. First, they are significant at 1%. Second, our results
suggest that when controlling for GDP, developed countries trade more than
non developed. We believe that this result is more realistic than the result ob-
tained by LV (completely the opposite) since the most important share of trade
is commercialized within developed economies. Third, the change observed in
the coefficient of transport costs between columns one and two reinforce the
hypothesis that transport costs affect trade by other channels different from
transport costs. Summing up, we can state that transport cost elasticity ranges
between −0.2 and −1.06. Therefore, an increase in the transport costs from
the median to the third upper quartile, implies a decrease in trade volume of
around 42%.25







. As before, the ratio was obtained from the summary statistics of
the infrastructure index, and the exponent is equal to the coefficient of the infrastructure
index; column four, table 2.











24Typical effect of an omitted variable bias.
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and decreasing transport costs. In particular, there is a common belief that non
developed trade level is lower than the trade achieved by developed economies.
Following this approach, and subject to the results presented by LV, tables 5
and 6 show the results obtained when we include a set of three type of African
dummy variables. We control for the case when one of the countries is an
African country, and we control for when the two countries involved in trade
are African countries.
Focusing on transport costs (table 5), we find that transport costs in African
countries are 220%26 higher than the rate experienced by the other countries
in the sample. In addition, trade is initially 83% higher,27 because intra trade
within African countries is very high. But when we control for infrastructure,
we find that transport costs in African countries are only 130%.28 In terms
of distance, once we have controlled for infrastructure, we find that transport
costs of trade among African countries located within 1000 km of distance are
54%29 higher than the costs of trade of other countries, and they increase up to
149% for trade among African countries within 3000 km of bilateral distance. In
terms of trade, we find that controlling for infrastructure, trade within African
countries is 87% higher.30 Epitomizing, we estimate that transport costs for
African countries are higher when the bilateral distance among them is higher
than 371 km.31 Additionally, trade among African countries is only higher when
they share a common border, given that the critical distance has to be lower
than 26 km.32
As previously mentioned, we proceeded to test the results obtained by LV
using a panel for the period between 1990 and 2003. The results are discussed
in the following section.
4.2. Extension, 1990-2003.
As shown, the central argument of LV is that the infrastructure level of
countries help to decrease transport costs and increase trade. But, on several
occasions the sign of the infrastructure variable is not the correct one (i.e.
tables 2 and 5). We strongly believe the LV index is capturing the level of
infrastructure within the country and is not capturing the infrastructure level
that is supposed to. Therefore, we proceed to expand LV results in two ways.
First, we expand the years contained in the data and we form a panel of bilateral
imports for the period comprehended between 1990 and 2003. Then, following
Micco (2004), and Micco and Serebrinzky (2005), we proceed to create two new
infrastructure indexes that we believe are a best approximation of the level of
infrastructure of ports per country. Finally, we introduce three new controls
26Is obtained by adding up the coefficients of African dummies in column 1 table 5.
27Is obtained by adding up the coefficients of African dummies in column 1 table 6.
28Is obtained by adding up the coefficients of African dummies in column 3 table 5.
29See table 5, column four. African 1000 result.
30See table 6, column four. African 1000 result.
31See table 5, column four. Critical distance result.
32See table 6, column four. Critical distance result.
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in our specifications: common language, level of corruption, and rule of law.
Taking advantage of the panel structure of the data, we control for year fixed
effects, country i fixed effects and country j fixed effects.
So how robust is the LV infrastructure index? As table 7 shows, this vari-
able is not a very good proxy for port infrastructure. In all the specifications,
the variable is not statistically different from zero and, in addition, the sign
associated with this variable is not the correct one; i.e. it should be positive.33
On the other hand, we find that common bilateral ties and political sta-
bilities of countries have an important effect on transport costs. As shown in
columns 2 through 6, common language and common border dummies always
have the right sign, and they are significant at 1%. In addition, once they
are introduced, they reduce the effect initially associated to bilateral distance.
Columns 4 through 6 control for the political stability per country. As shown,
countries with high level of corruption, or low level of law enforcement expe-
rience higher transport costs. This result is robust even when we control for
both of them at same time.
Since LV index is not a good proxy, we proceed to test our two sets of new
infrastructure indexes. As table 8A shows, our airport infrastructure index
always has the correct sign, and is always significantly different from zero at
5%. In addition, we found that the closer the airport and the better the quality,
the higher the reduction on transport costs are.
In addition, when we control for the country maritime port infrastructure,
our results may prove to be more interesting. As table 8B shows, we found
that countries with higher infrastructure levels of airports and maritime ports
experience the highest transport cost reductions.
Following our results in table 7, we proceed to test the robustness of the
new indexes even with the inclusion of the political stability channel. As table
9A and table 9B show, the results of both indexes are robust to the political
stability indexes, and more important, the importance of the political stability
variables remains unchanged; i.e. they have the right sign and are statistically
significant.34
As Micco and Serebrinzky (2005) explained, transport costs for air ship-
ments have been decreasing since the late 70’s. The importance of this effect is
very important as almost 35%35 of cargo is moved by air. As they point out,
one of the factors that influences the decrease in air transport costs is the estab-
lishment of bilateral open sky agreements (OSA). Following this approach, we
performed a final robustness check of our previous results. As table 10 shows,
our previous results are even robust to the inclusion of the OSA effect. As
shown, the effects of the infrastructure indexes, political stability and common
ties remain statistically significant and they all have the correct sign.
Following Micco and Serebrinzky (2005), we estimate that OSA reduce
33See equation (4).
34As a robustness exercise, in un-reported regressions we run the same specifications of
tables 9A and 9B with all the other infrastructure indexes used in tables 8A and 8B. We
found that our results are robust in any of this specifications.
35Micco and Serebrinzky (2005).
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transport costs by 0.85%. However, we find that this effect is only achieved
when both the importing and the exporting countries have signed an OSA
between each other (columns 6-9).
5. Conclusions
Following Limao and Venables (2001) we use an ad-hoc empirical model to
examine the possible determinants of transport costs. We replicate the results
obtained by LV (tables 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8), and we further submit their infras-
tructure variable to some robustness checks. We found that their index is not
robust to additional specifications. Therefore, we proceed to use two additional
measures of port infrastructures. One for airports, and one for ports. Control-
ling for quality, density, and population, we found that our measures are better
proxies than the infrastructure index used by LV.
In addition, we proceed to estimate the effect of common bilateral ties,
country political stability and open sky agreements on transport costs. We
found that apart from distance; infrastructure, political stability, common bi-
lateral ties and open sky agreements are other important channels through
which transport costs can be reduced.
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Figure 1.  Transport Cost per year
note: Kernel approximation
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Rev. Econ. Ros. Bogotá (Colombia) 11 (2): 221–247, diciembre de 2008
238 TRANSPORT COST, INFRASTRUCTURE, COMMON TIES AND POLITICAL STABILITY  	
    	 	     !"#$	%	% &$ '	( 		 &%	
 """ #! #))	 &%	
 $	%	% # #)) #"*'&	 &%	
 $	%	%  #)  ! "! &**& & !# ### ""+	 &%	
 $	%	%  "" ) ,-./0 01.234543402 56--0267/ 36 380 -.346 69 :-.;43< .7/ =>?@?AB 0234C.302DE6F-50G H0I145. ,.J10 KL M4C.6 .7/ N07.J102 OPQQRS
T		
   T	*	 &$ *'&	 T		
 U	V W'	 	& 	V '&	 &	 	&X #
:-.;43< 01.234543402 56--02I67/ 36 380 0234C.302 47 561FC7 Y ,.J10 PD=>?@?AB 01.234543402 56--02I67/ 36 380 0234C.302 47 561FC7 Y ,.J10 RD
Z[\][^_`a\[bcde\f gecf h[ife\ j`cf]k[f`lm nopoqo nrpossjopotom jopousmvvvwxyz {kde\f gf|p j_bpm opstu noporsjopor}mvvv jopossmwxyz ~de\f gf|p j_bpm opstjopor}mvvvwxy d`\ g[d]f[z {kde\f gf|p j_bpm opot} nopor}jopo}smvv joportmwxy d`\ g[d]f[z ~de\f gf|p j_bpm oprqjopoqrmvvvx]cf[bi` j_bpm nop}r noproujopo}}mvvv jopotme\l`\ xkk| opso nop}qujoprqmvvv joprr}mvvvyc`le nc[\`l opqrs opsr]k[ rpqu rprqqq
        ¡¡¢£
a[^_` ¤p a\[l` Ze_k`c [bl y\`l]if`l {kde\f gecfcz ruuopx`d`bl`bf Z[\][^_`¥ ]_[f`\[_ {kde\fc j_bpm [c`l ebh__ ¦el`_ [c`l eb h]`l~§§`if ¦el`_
¨  © ª «¬  ­® ¯ °© ° °± °© ° ­®  °© ° 
ae^]f ae^]f°   °© ² ­³°° ¢¡´µ ²² ­³°°¶´µ ²²² ­³°° ¢́ ·° ̧­ ®  ° ¹° °º °» °   °° ³°°° ° ³      ¼ ³°  
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